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ABSTRACT: It is a virtue of virtue theory approaches to argumentation that they integrate many of the 
different factors that make arguments good arguments. The insights of virtue argumentation are brought to 
bear on a variety of versions of the requirement that good arguments must have good premises, concluding 
that a sincerity condition serves better than truth or assertability conditions, despite apparently 
counterintuitive consequences for arguments involving heterogeneous coalitions. 
 





Virtue argumentation theory (VAT) is an approach that begins from the insight that a 
good argument is one in which the arguers argue well. It shifts the focus from the 
products of argumentation to the arguers and their conduct. Of course, this simple 
formula is of little help when discussions about what counts as arguing well remain 
unsettled. 
 Even so, the value of VAT to contribute to debates about existing problems in 
argumentation theory is already evident, having shed light on the traditional question of 
how arguments go wrong, but also on such important but often-overlooked questions as 
when and when not to argue, how argumentation contributes to cognitive achievements 
beyond the narrowly epistemic, and what the different responsibilities of proponents, 
opponents, and audiences are in argumentation.1 
In this paper, VAT is applied to the requirement that good arguments have good 
premises. There are many versions of this requirement, ranging from the extremely strong 
claim that the premises be both true and known to be true, to weaker versions asking for 
accepted or even just acceptable premises.2 
Consistent with its focus on arguers, what matters for VAT is that arguers be 
sincere. The apparently obvious counter-examples of good arguments offered insincerely 
all equivocate on “argument” for their evaluations.3 I defend a sincerity requirement for 
 
1 Virtue Argumentation Theory is developed in Aberdeen 2006 and Cohen 2007. 
2 See, for example, the textbooks Govier 1992 or Blair and Johnson 1994. The truth requirement for 
arguments is addressed more directly in Allen 1998, Johnson 1999, and Kasser and Cohen 2002. 
3 Sincerity cannot, of course, be a sufficient condition for good argumentation, only a necessary one. Adler 
2007 argues against a sincerity condition. 
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arguers. It supplies the tie that binds the epistemological and the logical aspects of 
argument evaluation. And because it situates argumentation in linguistic communities, it 
explains our reluctance to use the often-effective arguments of our coalition partners with 
whom we have other disagreements. However, it also leads to the unsettling conclusion 
that there are no really good public, political arguments at all! What there can be is a lot 
of arguing in public and a great deal of political manoeuvring, but they are very different 
moments in discourse. 
 
2. GOOD ARGUMENTS 
 
There are many senses of the word “argument” and many more ways to evaluate them, 
but I would think that any account with aspirations of completeness would have to 
include at a minimum some reference to logical validity, dialectical closure, and 
rhetorical competence. It is a relatively straightforward exercise to find examples of 
rhetorically successful and dialectically satisfying arguments that do not pass logical 
muster, or arguments that are logically unimpeachable and reach dialectical closure, but 
fail on rhetorical grounds, or any of the other combinations, simply by varying the 
epistemological standpoint or logical prowess of the proponents, opponents, and 
audiences. In each case, there is something relevant and negative to be said against the 
argument qua argument,4 so each of these is a necessary condition for good 
argumentation. 
 While those three axes of measurement jointly provide a very rich conceptual 
vocabulary for evaluating arguments, it is still not enough. There is also a fuller, more 
robust sense of goodness to incorporate into our accounts. Consider, for comparison, the 
ways we talk about good work. A carpenter who is technically competent will be 
commended for doing good work; a job that is personally engaging and rewarding is said 
to be a good one—good work if you can get it; and efforts to moral ends are good works 
indeed.5 
 An argument ought to be good on all those counts, too: technically competent, 
rewarding to all its participants, and conducted in accord with moral principles to moral 
ends. At the end of an argument that wove all three strands together, all the participants 
could truly say, “Now, that was a good argument!”6 
 As a group, we have done a lot of good work, in the first sense, on the first strand 
in this more robust concept of good work, viz., on what counts as technical competence 
and excellence. There has been some attention, perhaps less, to the ethics of argument, 
and some of that has been good work, too, at least in the technical sense, and, I’m sure, in 
the ethical sense. I want to engage with the second sense here: the role of the participants’ 
intellectual engagement in evaluating argumentation. 
 Intellectual engagement is a necessary condition; it is the necessary investment 
one must make in order to reap the epistemological returns that are at the heart of the 
robust sense of goodness for arguments. And, incidentally, it is what makes the war 
                                                                         
 
4 These possibilities are worked out in greater detail in Cohen 2004, chapter 6 
5 The integration of the concepts of “good work” is the central theme of The GoodWork Project. \ See their 
website at: http://goodworkproject.org/ 
6The robust concept of goodness sketched here is developed and presented in Cohen 2008. 
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metaphor so spectacularly inappropriate because in the best arguments, the winners teach 
and the losers learn—which is to say that the losers are the real winners. 
 
3. SANTA CLAUS ARGUMENTS 
 
Consider the following argument as one of our data points: an exhausted and exasperated 
parent is trying to get a young child to go to bed for the night. However, being mindful of 
what it is to be a good parent and committed to the canons of rationality, the parent does 
not want to resort to heavy-handed tactics. Reasoning and argumentation, rather than 
bribes or threats, ought to be able to carry the day. After pointing out, to no effect, some 
obvious signs that the child is getting tired, and after a series of unsuccessful appeals to 
the importance of a good night’s rest for growing bodies, the parent finally says, “Well, 
you know, it’s only a few days until Christmas, and Santa Claus is watching young 
children especially closely right now to see who is naughty and who is nice, so that he 
can bring the right presents to the right children. And you do want to impress Santa 
Claus, don’t you? So, isn’t that a pretty good reason to go to bed without any more fuss.” 
The child objects, “But staying up late isn’t naughty. You do it all the time!” And the 
parent responds, “Oh, it’s not staying up late that’s the problem; it’s not listening to your 
parents that’s the issue.” Hearing this, and thinking it over, the child is, in the end, 
persuaded. More than that, she is convinced, and maybe even a bit abashed that she 
hadn’t thought of it herself! 
 Let me note at the outset, and I hope we can all agree, that this is not what we 
would want to hold up as a good example of argumentation. However, in our haste to 
criticize it, we should not lose sight of the fact that it really does have some very 
significant positive features. In the first place, from the parent’s point of view, it was 
successful because it did indeed succeed in getting the child into bed without recourse to 
physical, emotional, or intellectual abuse—and that is certainly not negligible. Beyond 
that, it can easily be reconstructed into a valid chain of inferences from the premises to 
the conclusion that would pass muster with even the most enthusiastic deductivist. 
Moreover, that reconstruction would employ only premises that were acceptable to the 
target audience. Finally, the child was given the chance to object and question and be 
heard, and she was satisfied by the answers. In sum, we ought to recognize and admit that 
this argument is logically valid, dialectically closed, rhetorically appropriate, and even 
agonistically successful! What’s not to like? 
 Actually, there are plenty of things not to like, starting with the fact that there is 
no Santa Claus who rewards children on the basis of whether they are taken in by the 
sophistries of their parents. The parent knows better, even if the child does not. But even 
if, in a second scenario, unbeknownst to the parent, there were such an old man, a kindly-
looking stranger with a suspicious penchant for giving presents to children, it would still 
not count as a paradigm of good argumentation because the parent, the proponent in the 
argument, does not believe it and regards the child’s belief—which would be fortuitously 
true in this case—as unjustified. And that would still be the case if, in a third scenario, 
unbeknownst to the parent, the child’s belief were not just true, but justified, e.g., by the 
reliable authority of older siblings and direct sightings of her own. Finally, let us 
complete the analytic isolation of the problem by imagining a fourth scenario, a world 
with an existing Santa Claus, an unbelieving parent with a believing child in which both 
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the parent and child have access to sufficient justification, but only the child takes heed. It 
would still be an objectionable piece of argumentation. 
 
4. JU-JITSU ARGUMENTS 
 
Before getting into exactly what the source of the problems are, let me offer another 
example for contrast. Two people disagree about whether same-sex couples should have 
the same civic and legal options with respect to marriage as heterosexual couples. The 
opponent bases her opposition on two distinct but convergent lines of thought: what is 
natural and what is traditional. First, she appeals to a Thomistic concept of the natural 
telos of marriage, which she identifies as procreation—and procreation is just not in the 
cards for most same-sex couples. Second, as a classic political conservative who shares 
Edmund Burke’s suspicion of innovation based on utopian or speculative reason, she 
appeals instead to time-tested tradition—and same-sex marriages just aren’t traditional. 
Her opponent, who shares none of her theologico-metaphysical assumptions or 
traditionalist political principles, offers two arguments in response. He replies to the 
appeal to procreation as the justifying telos for marriage by asking, in a bit of an ad 
hominem, whether that is why she has objected to her own 70-year-old widowed mother’s 
recent re-marriage. Wouldn’t it also have to be disallowed as illegitimate since 
procreation is surely not part of it? Any rebuttal that would justify senior marriages by 
reference to the other things that marriages provide—love, commitment, companionship, 
stability, security, or family—are forestalled because they would also be applicable to 
same-sex marriages. To the other argument, he points out that it is precisely because the 
institution of marriage has stood the test of time that its benefits should be available to 
same sex-couples, rather than some new and untested social innovation. It is precisely 
because of the importance of such “family values” as love, commitment, companionship, 
stability, security, and family that one should want to promote and extend their presence 
in society. In short, he deploys Thomistic metaphysics as premises for one argument—
although as a secularist, he would say that he knows better than to take them seriously—
and he then offers a traditionalist-conservative argument for same-sex marriage—even 
though his own political ideals are more radical, including a preference to do away with 
the institution of marriage completely. 
 Now I personally happen to think that the proponent’s reasons have some merit, 
but I also have a nagging worry: if he is using premises he does not really believe, aren’t 
his arguments just grown-up versions of the Santa Claus argument? Why don’t they elicit 
the same disapproval? What’s the difference? 
 Not all arguments that employ opponents’ own principles against them—let’s call 
them “jujitsu arguments”—are Santa Claus arguments. Reductio ad absurdum arguments 
make provisional use of opponents’ principles only to reject them in the end. Similarly, 
arguments leading to conditional or assertoric conclusions are unobjectionable examples 
of speculative and hypothetical reasoning. Much of what is objectionable would 
disappear if the conclusion were, “If you believe in Santa Claus, then you should think 
that you go to bed,” or “Since you believe in Santa Claus, you should think that you 
should go to bed.” In the Santa Claus case as given, though, the conclusion was not 
qualified in either way. It exploited the opponent’s own questionable beliefs without 
question, in order to support other conclusions, leaving those premises unchallenged 
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(unlike reductios) and purporting to reach categorical conclusions (unlike hypothetical 
reasoning). 
 The part of the argument referring to the opponent’s widowed mother’s late-in-
life re-marriage is best read as a reductio argument with the enthymematic premise that 
that marriage should not be stigmatized as illegitimate (at least not for that reason). But 
the other line of thought, invoking family values in a conservative argument for same-sex 
marriages, does appear to fit the mold of a Santa Claus argument to a tee. The proponent 
regards the sacred-cow status of so-called “family values” among the evangelical right 
roughly the way the parent regards the very special belief in Santa Claus among children: 
a comforting fairy tale for those who don’t know any better. Isn’t he patronizing his 
interlocutor in much the same way the parent patronized the child? And yet, we hesitate 
to condemn that argument. 
 Perhaps we are (or at least, I am) ambivalent about this case because there is so 
much that is praiseworthy. Santa Claus arguments, as noted, can be logically valid, 
dialectically closed, rhetorically excellent, and agonistically successful. Still, there is that 




What the four scenarios for the Santa Claus argument show is that the flaw in the 
argumentation is not that the premises are false, unknown by, or unjustified to the 
different parties to the argument. And what the two halves of the same-sex marriage 
debate show is that the problem cannot be simply that the proponent doubts or disbelieves 
his own premises. 
 We can sum up the problem in a single word, insincerity. The arguer has not 
argued virtuously. We need to be clear, however, that the problem is more than just an 
epistemological question about how arguers relate to their premises. Nor is it entirely an 
ethical matter regarding how arguers relate to imperatives about honesty and to their 
fellow arguers. Rather it is an entire series of questions about how arguers relate to their 
own argumentation. The common element is that there is a lack of respect: the arguers in 
question lack respect for truth, they lack respect for their interlocutors, and they lack 
respect for argumentation. It is a question of being authentic arguers.7 
 I will focus on indifference to the truth because it is in many ways the most 
important and the most revealing, and fairly representative of the others. There is a 
difference between simple dishonesty and a disregard for the truth.8 Dishonesty is largely 
an ethical matter. Disregard for the truth is, too, of course, but it is also an 
epistemological matter. It is a compromise of one’s epistemological integrity because it 
disengages and distances one from the pursuit of knowledge—and indeed, from any of 
the possible cognitive gains that can come about through argumentation. There are, of 
course, many reasons to argue ranging from the personal to the social, for practical ends 
and for pure theoretical ones, but the ones that involve us epistemologically and 
cognitively must be accorded a privileged position in theorizing about argumentation. 
That is the source of the payoffs that really matter. Insincerity—lack of respect for the 
                         
7 The line of reasoning developed in Williams 2004, ch.1, in which he makes the case that the concept of 
truth includes ethical imperatives towards truthfulness, would seem to apply here. 
8 Frankfurt 2005 forcefully presses this distinction and isolates the added negative value of insincerity. 
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truth—is an insurmountable obstacle to the kind of engagement that is necessary if we are 
ever going to gain anything—to learn anything—from an argument. 
 Are there no good arguments insincerely presented? 
 If all we are concerned with is the product of arguing, then obviously sincerity is 
irrelevant. A sound proof considered as a sequence of premises and a conclusion is sound 
regardless of the mental state of the person who presents it; indeed, it is sound even if no 
one ever presents and it remains a disembodied structure of abstract propositions. There 
is indeed a sense of the word “argument” that is consonant with that use. It is harder to 
maintain that extreme Platonism, however, when we think of arguments as phenomena 
that include arguers. The robust sense of good argument that is being used here—the one 
that could end with its arguers saying, “Now that was a good argument”—must, perforce, 
be fully embodied. 
 The problem with insincerity, as noted, is the lack of engagement. Consider an 
extreme case: suppose a non-mathematically inclined friend memorized the steps in a 
proof and also stock answers to the standard questions. He presents what he has 
rehearsed, but without any real understanding, you raise objections, he answers, and in 
the end you are convinced. There is no genuine communicative, epistemic, or 
argumentative engagement. While you could learn something that way, it would be a 
poor metaphor to say that your innumerate friend taught you or argued with you. For that 
matter, a parrot could do what your friend did—and parrots do not argue. Or, to bring 
matters into a higher, and absurd, relief, suppose two parrots memorized and repeated the 
different parts in the dialogue. Would we really want to say that that even was an 
argument—let alone a good argument?  
 Insincerity disengages us from our argument, and it becomes irrelevant whether 
we even comprehend what we are saying. We are not really listening to what we are 
saying. It effectively turns us into parrots. 
 When an arguer lacks respect for his opponents and their arguments, it ensures 
that they will not teach him anything. When an arguer lacks respect for her own 
arguments, it further ensures that she will not learn anything. Thus, when arguers lacks 
respect for argumentation, it guarantees that their arguments will never be robustly good 
ones. 
 
6. CONCLUSION: POLITICAL COALITIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
 
Let me conclude by offering some curious, and perhaps a bit unsettling, corollaries to this 
way of thinking about arguments when it is applied to public, political argumentation. 
 The salient feature of political controversies is that they take place in the public 
sphere. Because the questions are of general interest, anyone might qualify as an 
interested party. Often, the issue is settled by a ballot, but there can also be something 
closer to real resolution when the tide of public opinion turns. The questions of slavery, 
contraception, prohibition, and women’s suffrage and equal rights can all be said to have 
been resolved, with only negligible pockets of those refusing to join the general 
consensus. Still, there are those hold-outs, despite the fact that the mainstream of the 
opposition in each case has acquiesced. 
 In contrast, the limited legal access to abortions and the almost unlimited access 
to pornography in the United States are examples of matters that are, at best, only more or 
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less settled because even though the access in each case is an established fact of political 
life, there is continuing and, in the former case, very active resistance to that status quo. 
Feminists favouring legal abortion are joined by libertarians and opposed by Evangelicals 
on the first question, while feminists opposing pornography are joined by Evangelicals 
and opposed by libertarians on the second. Politics really does make for very strange 
bedfellows. 
 Argumentation is the public sphere is always a multi-party affair. The proponents 
cannot be assumed to form a monolithic bloc. They do not necessarily share a single 
standpoint. They may argue from very different premises. All that is common is that they 
reach the same conclusion from their various arguments—although, on close inspection, 
there are likely be very different versions and interpretations of that conclusion, 
differences that are sublimated by the greater differences with the opposition. The same 
comments all apply to opponents’ coalitions. 
 These facts give rise to a problem. Suppose an important piece of environmental 
legislation is to be voted on by the legislature. Liberal progressive environmentalists are 
free to make their case for that legislation at the same time that Christian Evangelical 
“Creation Care” environmentalists make a very different case. Their separate voices 
simply combine here to make a louder call for the legislation at hand.  
 However, political exigencies can bring uneasy coalition-partners together in 
uncomfortable ways. If a liberal progressive environmentalist is called upon to present 
the case for the legislation before an assembly of Christian Evangelicals, rhetorical 
imperatives call for a Creation Care argument—which, in her voice, would be a Santa 
Claus argument! Similarly, if a member of the Creation Care Movement circulates a 
petition in support of the legislation, and the preamble to that petition begins, “Whereas 
all of Creation is a sacred trust having been created through and for Christ…,”9 political 
imperatives may call for a signature, but wouldn’t that make a non-Christian 
environmentalist party to—and guilty of—a Santa Claus argument just by signing on?   
 Public, political arguments involve coalitions. Coalitions do not (or rarely, if ever) 
engage each other epistemologically. Epistemological engagement is a necessary 
condition for a genuine argument, and only genuine arguments can be good in the full, 
robust sense of the word. Therefore, to complete the sorites, public, political arguments 
can never be genuinely good arguments in the full and robust sense, although there is 
nothing to prevent individuals within opposing coalitions to engage in argumentation of 
the very best sort.  
 In a final irony, Santa Claus arguments may, in the end be unobjectionable in the 
political sphere precisely because political debates involving coalitions are more about 
political manoeuvring than epistemic engagement and genuine argumentation. That is, in 
the context of public controversies, Santa Claus arguments are not necessarily bad 
arguments because, necessarily, they are not really arguments. 
 
         Link to commentary 
 
 
                         









Aberdein, A. (2006). Virtue argumentation. Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of International Society for 
the Study of Argumentation. Amsterdam: SICSAT. 
Adler, J. (2007). Cohen on Virtue Argumentation. In: H. V. Hansen, et al. (Eds.), Dissensus and the Search 
for Common Ground. CD-ROM. Windsor, Ontario: Ontario Society for the Study of 
Argumentation. 
Allen, D. (1998). Should we assess the basic principles of an argument for truth or acceptability? 
Argumentation and Rhetoric: Proceedings of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, 
CD-ROM. 
Blair, J.A. and Johnson R. (1994). Logical Self-Defense, U.S. edition. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Cohen, D. (2004). Arguments and Metaphors in Philosophy. University Press of America. 
Cohen, D. (2007). Virtue epistemology and argumentation Theory. In: H. V. Hansen, et al. (Eds.). 
Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground. Windsor, ON: OSSA. 
Cohen, D. (2008). Now that was a good argument. Conferencia Internacionale:Llogica, argumentacion y 
pensamiento critico. Santiago, Chile. 
Creation Care for Pastors. http://www.creationcareforpastors.com/in-the-bible/ 
Frankfurt, H. (2005). On Bullshit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
The GoodWork Project, http://goodworkproject.org/. 
Govier, T. (1992). A Practical Study of Argument 3rd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co. 
Johnson, R. (1999). The problem of truth for theories of argument. In: F. H. van Eemeren, et al. (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of 
Argumentation. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: SIC SAT. 
Kasser, J. and Cohen, D. (2002). Putnam, truth, and informal logic. Philosophica (Belgium). 69, 85-109. 
Williams, B. (2004). Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.  
 
